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FOUR PRIORITIES UP TO 2024 TO FOSTER THE EU ENERGY TRANSITION
THE ISSUE
Over the last decade, the European Union has pursued a proactive climate policy and has 
integrated a significant amount of renewable technologies – such as solar and wind – into 
the established energy system. These efforts have proved successful and continuing along 
this pathway, increasing renewables and improving energy efficiency would not require 
substantial policy shifts. But the EU now needs a much deeper energy transformation to: i) 
decarbonise in line with the Paris agreement; ii) seize the economic and industrial oppor-
tunities offered by this global transformation; and iii) develop an EU approach to energy 
competitiveness and security, as the EU has neither the United States’ shale potential nor 
China’s top-down investment possibilities.
POLICY CHALLENGE
A full-fledged energy transition is becoming economically and technically feasible, with 
most of the necessary technologies now available and technology costs declining. The cost 
of the transition would be similar to that of maintaining the existing system, if appropriate 
policies and regulations are put in place. In short, the EU could benefit from deep decar-
bonisation irrespective of what other economies around the world do. The transition can 
also be socially acceptable, if the right policies are put in place to control and mitigate the 
distributional effects of deeper decarbonisation. The time to act is now, because energy 
is a rigid system in which infrastructure and regulatory changes take a decade to be fully 
implemented, while competition is not sleeping – as Chinese solar panels and the rise of the 
electric vehicles industry clearly show. Policy choices made up to 2024 will define the shape 
of the EU energy system by 2050.
Priority 1. Adopt tranformative policies to decarbonise the transport sector
Priority 2. Get the electricity system ready for a substantial increase of renewables
Priority 3. Strengthen the EU comparative advantage in low-carbon technologies
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1 SETTING THE RIGHT ENERGY 
PRIORITIES FOR THE NEW EU 
INSTITUTIONAL CYCLE
The new members of the European 
Parliament and European Commission 
who start their mandates in 2019 should 
put in place major policy elements to 
unleash the energy transition. Political 
capital is – as always – limited, but four 
priorities are crucial to foster the EU en-
ergy transition: i) adopt transformative 
policies to decarbonise the transport 
sector; ii) prepare the electricity system 
for a substantial increase in renewables1, 
at acceptable cost and without compro-
mising security; iii) strengthen the EU’s 
comparative advantage in low-carbon 
technologies; and iv) foster the decar-
bonisation of industry and buildings.
The deep decarbonisation of electric-
ity, transport, industry and buildings is 
an environmental imperative for Europe, 
and a unique economic opportunity. 
Decarbonising the European economy 
would make a significant contribution to 
the fight against global warming, as well 
as cleaning-up the air European citizens 
breath every day. Air pollution contin-
ues to be an invisible killer in Europe, 
causing each year almost half a million 
premature deaths (European Environ-
ment Agency, 2018a). Decarbonising 
the European economy also signifies 
investing in the industries of tomorrow. 
Europe has the potential to be a global 
leader in the manufacture of products 
such as wind turbines, electric cars and 
new-generation batteries. Investing in 
these industries can ensure the Euro-
pean manufacturing system’s long-term 
economic competitiveness and sustain-
ability2. 
Decarbonisation policies should 
be carefully crafted because without 
extensive consideration of their distri-
butional consequences there is a risk 
of social backlash3. Avoiding this risk 
is possible, but it is crucial that the EU 
and national governments properly 
assess the distributional effects of their 
energy and climate policies, and take 
adequate measures to address them 
(Tagliapietra and Zachmann, 2018). 
This also applies to carbon pricing: the 
gap between actual prices and those 
required to achieve ambitious climate 
change mitigation could be closed by 
promoting public acceptance of carbon 
pricing through the effective use of the 
substantial revenues raised (Klenert et 
al, 2017).
2 KEY POLICY PRIORITIES TO FOSTER 
THE EU ENERGY TRANSITION
PRIORITY 1: ADOPT TRANSFORMATIVE POLICIES 
TO DECARBONISE THE TRANSPORT SECTOR 
Between 1990 and 2016, the EU’s green-
house gas emissions decreased signifi-
cantly in all sectors with the exception 
of transport, which saw a 20 percent 
increase (European Environment Agen-
cy, 2018b) (Figure 1). Transport is thus 
becoming a key obstacle to EU decar-
bonisation. A particular focus should 
be placed on decarbonising road trans-
port because it is responsible for more 
than 70 percent of overall transport 
emissions. 
Figure 1: EU greenhouse gas emissions by sector, 1990-2016











































1.   Over the last decade, 
renewables have become 
substantially more impor-
tant in the EU energy mix. 
In 2017, the share of energy 
from renewable sources 
in EU gross final energy 
consumption reached 
17.5 percent, up from 8.5 
percent in 2004 (Eurostat, 
2019).
2.  See Fredriksson et al (2018) 
for an in-depth discussion 
of the case of electric vehi-
cles.
3. As illustrated by France’s 
‘Gilets jaunes’ movement, 
which kicked-off when the 
government announced its 
intention to rise fuel prices 
for environmental reasons, 
and then rapidly targeted 
overall high cost of living, 
claiming that a dispro-
portionate burden of the 
government's tax reforms 
were falling on the middle 
classes.
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Decarbonising road transport would also 
improve air quality in cities, which re-
mains a fundamental challenge for better 
public health in Europe. All this should 
be done by assessing and addressing the 
distributive effects of transport decarbon-
isation policies, notably by taking into 
account that countries are made up of 
regions and constituencies with varying 
characteristics, including large semi-ru-
ral territories populated by low-income 
individuals deprived of public transport 
options and heavily sensitive to direct/in-
direct transport taxation (Zachmann, et al, 
2018; Danesin and Linares, 2018).
To achieve the EU vision of a carbon-neu-
tral economy by 2050 (European Com-
mission, 2018), much stronger policies are 
thus required for transportation. Other-
wise, under current policies, transport 
emissions might well exceed 1990 levels 
by 15 percent in 2050 (European Environ-
ment Agency, 2016).
Decarbonisation of transport will 
involve a range of policies. First, to replace 
the kilometres travelled by road vehicles, 
public transport, alternative transport 
modes such as walking and cycling, 
and more integrated modes of mobility 
should be promoted. New mobility such 
as ‘mobility-as-a-service’ can be enabled 
by ongoing developments in digital 
technologies. For instance, smartphone 
apps can allow information about 
transportation services from public and 
private providers to be better combined 
through a single gateway that creates and 
manages the trip, for which users can pay 
via a single account. New approaches 
could help overcome a major comparative 
disadvantage of public transport – the 
longer door-to-door travel times – which 
mainly arise from the first and the last 
mile in the transport chain.
The environmental impact of freight 
transport could be reduced by promoting 
a switch from road to rail and maritime, 
and including the environmental cost 
of transport in the final purchase price 
of goods. To unleash the enormous 
decarbonisation potential of these 
options, new policies are needed, 
including economic incentives such as 
congestion charges, public investment 
in railways and urban public transport, 
and new approaches to urban planning 
and development licencing. For aviation, 
modernisation of airport operations 
and air traffic control can deliver major 
efficiency gains. It should also be noted 
that very busy European air routes, such as 
Berlin to Frankfurt or Paris to Amsterdam, 
are suitable for international high-speed 
trains.
A second approach to the 
decarbonisation of transport is promotion 
of clean vehicles. The average age of the 
private car fleet in the EU is 7.5 years. This 
has been increasing since 2000, and in 
many EU countries this age even reaches 
10 years (European Environment Agency, 
2018c). The average car in Europe is, 
typically, high-emitting. Policies should 
therefore promote the accelerated 
substitution of the existing fleet by new, 
more advanced, low-emitting cars. From an 
economist’s point of view, the first option 
would be to internalise fully into fuel prices 
the external costs of transport emissions, 
to disincentivise the use of older cars. 
However, public protests over fuel prices 
have shown that the political economy of 
these measures is very complex.
A combination of policies is therefore 
required, including carrots and sticks, 
starting from the key EU policy tool in the 
field: emission standards. In December 
2018, the EU reached an agreement to 
reduce per kilometre carbon dioxide 
emissions from new cars by 37.5 percent 
by 2030 compared to 2021 (European 
Council, 2018). This represents a positive 
step, but it not enough to ensure the 
deep decarbonisation of the sector by 
2050. Other tools to phase-out polluting 
cars could include: i) gradual, long-term 
increases in fuel taxes that internalise 
fully external costs (including congestion 
charges) but give consumers time to 
adapt; ii) higher registration taxes that 
deter consumers from buying high-
polluting cars; and iii) limitations on high-
polluting vehicles accessing metropolitan 
areas. To foster this transition and ensure 
its social acceptability, the following 
measures could be adopted: i) subsidies 
that help low-income consumers buy new 
cars and scrap their old ones; ii) policies 
that support the deployment of clean 
public transport (which may be crowded 
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out by car-sharing options); and iii) R&D 
support for alternative vehicles.
Electric vehicles have emerged as 
a promising option to decarbonise the 
energy input into transportation. With 
smart charging, electric vehicles might 
also add additional flexibility to the 
power system, and thus contribute to the 
further integration of even greater wind 
and solar energy production. But other 
technologies might also contribute to 
this decarbonisation, including lower-
emission combustion vehicles in the short 
term or hydrogen in the longer term. EU 
policy should be flexible enough to be able 
to take advantage, in a cost-effective way, 
of all the alternatives available.
For long-distance and heavy transport, 
technological uncertainty is far greater – 
not to mention maritime and air transport. 
In these cases, various options could 
contribute to decarbonisation, including 
advanced biofuels, green gas and 
synthetic fuels.
PRIORITY 2: PREPARE THE ELECTRICITY SYSTEM 
FOR A SUBSTANTIAL INCREASE IN RENEWABLES
In the EU, most of the expansion of 
renewable energy generation arises from 
utility-scale projects. Wind is more im-
portant in Europe than solar, and for wind 
the average project size is increasing. The 
most promising developments in recent 
years have been the technology and cost 
breakthroughs related to offshore wind, 
which have made possible really large-
scale developments. Progress has been 
made in integrating utility-scale renewa-
bles, but it is still an unfinished journey: 
transmission needs to be expanded both 
onshore and offshore, more flexibility 
needs to be added and ultimately a better 
market design is needed. 
Furthermore, the European electricity 
sector is on the verge of structural 
change, towards more digitalisation and 
decentralisation. The last fundamental 
change in the EU energy industry was the 
establishment of wholesale markets in the 
1990s. That change, together with the entry 
of new players and new technologies4, 
required new common EU rules on 
efficiency, competition and security. The 
European electricity transmission industry 
reorganised accordingly, creating a ‘smart 
grid 1.0’5 to make all this work.
The ambitious EU vision of a carbon-
neutral economy by 2050 calls for new 
fundamental changes, involving notably 
the greening of all the supply, activation of 
all demand-side management solutions, 
reviewing the stock of appliances, 
engines and their standards, sharing of 
all the assets, codes and data. This can 
only be achieved with a digitalised and 
decentralised energy system. Greater 
decentralisation and digitalisation would 
foster renewable energy deployment in a 
more efficient and cost-competitive way.
In this context, decentralisation 
of the energy sector would happen in 
various areas and for different reasons. 
Renewables generation would bring down 
the size of generating units: a nuclear 
power plant can have a capacity of 2 
gigawatts and coal or natural gas-fired 
power plants a capacity of several hundred 
megawatts, but the capacity of an onshore 
wind turbine averages to 3 megawatts and 
the capacity of a solar panel amounts to 
some kilowatts. A similar transformation 
would occur on the demand side, where 
operators would aggregate kilowatt units 
of consumption to enter the wholesale 
market. Decentralised generation, 
aggregated demand and individual 
storage would take place ‘behind the 
meter’, in other words in a domestic or 
small-scale context, such as rooftop solar 
panels generating electricity for domestic 
use or batteries used to power electric 
cars. These domestic appliances are 
thus not covered by traditional energy 
regulation (Glachant and Rossetto, 2018).
The EU should act to accelerate this 
convergence between decentralisation 
and digitalisation. This should primarily 
happen in the distribution system, 
which is the place where the numerous 
distributed actions, behind and beyond 
the meter, physically interact by 
combining on a local level consumption, 
storage and generation. The distribution 
system should become an open platform, 
through which the various decisions of 
the multiple players can interact in a 
transparent and flexible manner.
Such an open platform would require 
a common distribution operation code, 
focusing on connected electricity devices, 
4. For example, combined 
cycle gas turbine plants.
5. Smart grids and smart 
meters ‘1.0’, for instance, 
allow distribution compa-
nies and energy suppliers 
to reduce the cost of 
metering consumption and 
to detect electricity thefts 
better. They do not create a 
universal, interconnected 
space of operation, and – 
more importantly – they 
do not offer radically new 
services or personalised 
options to consumers.
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to allow a more flexible flow of electricity. 
Secondly, it would need a framework 
for common data coding and sharing, 
offering protection from fragmentation, 
cyber threats or dominance abuse. A third 
layer would be the tariffs charged by the 
distribution platforms, but this might 
be left entirely to national legislation, 
with a safeguard in EU competition law 
against abuse of dominant position by any 
distribution platform.
As decentralisation and digitalisation 
accelerates, each European country 
would be free to pick the kind of industry 
arrangement it prefers to deliver the high 
EU decarbonisation target. The options 
would be: i) A takeover by the dominant 
tech companies (such as Google), which 
would become operators of national 
distribution platforms; ii) Transformation 
of the existing grid operators into digital 
companies; iii) A blossoming of start-ups 
that would reinvent the energy sector; iv) 
The growth of distributed solutions such 
as energy communities.
Whatever choice each member state 
makes, the EU will need to put in place a 
pan-European framework that establishes 
a coherent multi-level architecture for 
data exchange and power-flow operation. 
This will enable the proper interaction of 
transmission and distribution networks, 
microgrids and communities, smart 
buildings and the Internet of things 
(Schmitt, 2019).
PRIORITY 3: STRENGTHEN THE EU’S COMPARATIVE 
ADVANTAGE IN LOW-CARBON TECHNOLOGIES
The Paris Agreement should accelerate the 
global transition to a low-carbon econ-
omy. Global investment in low-carbon 
technology sectors – driven by investment 
in renewable electricity generation – has 
increased substantially and this trend is 
likely to continue. The strengthening of the 
EU’s comparative advantage in low-car-
bon technologies would provide future 
job and growth opportunities. To achieve 
the EU's energy and climate policy targets, 
a wide range of low-carbon innovation is 
needed in different sectors including elec-
tricity, heat and cooling, transportation 
(see priority 1), the built environment and 
energy-intensive industrial sectors includ-
ing iron and steel, metals, cement, pulp and 
paper and chemicals. Compared to the rest 
of the world, the EU is highly specialised 
in research and innovation in renewables 
and energy efficiency in buildings, and has 
increased its specialisation in renewable 
fuels, bioenergy, batteries and e-mobility 
(Zachmann and Kalcik, 2018).
A country’s competitive advantage in 
a particular sector often coincides with 
an R&D specialisation in the same area. 
For example, countries that specialise 
in patenting in a certain low-carbon 
sector are also specialised in exporting 
in this sector. A number of factors can 
drive such R&D specialisation, including 
policy factors such as ‘technology-push’ 
measures including innovation subsidies, 
and ‘demand-pull’ measures including 
public procurement. Factors such as path 
dependencies also play an important role 
for both clean and dirty technologies. 
Past developments are less important 
for immature technologies and there is 
therefore an opportunity to shape the 
comparative advantage of many early 
stage low-carbon technologies. The major 
benefits associated with low-carbon 
innovation justify support throughout 
the innovation process from research to 
development and to deployment.
Public funding is particularly important 
in early stages of the innovation cycle. 
Public investment in low-carbon research 
and innovation and private investment 
(which accounts for about 80 percent of 
total expenditure) increased substantially 
in the last decade. This led to an overall 
increase in low-carbon technology patents 
(International Renewable Energy Agency, 
2019). However, there are substantial 
differences between the sectors: private 
investment in the EU focuses mainly 
on batteries and e-mobility, renewable 
energy technologies and energy efficiency 
in industry. Renewable fuels and 
integrated and flexible energy systems 
attract larger shares of public investment. 
There is practically no EU research 
and innovation investment in energy 
efficiency in buildings, in carbon capture 
and storage or in the decarbonisation of 
industrial processes, even though these 
are potential game changers necessary 
for deep decarbonisation in the coming 
decades and thus should be R&I priorities. 
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It should be noted that it is mainly applied 
research done outside universities and 
national laboratories that is responsible 
for technology development in energy 
efficiency. Energy efficiency patents 
are positively associated with other 
non-energy innovations, and so general 
policies to promote innovation will also 
foster energy conservation inventions 
(Rexhäuser and Löschel, 2015).
Other examples for strategic 
R&D are potential breakthroughs in 
electrochemical or alternative storage 
technologies, the hydrogen economy 
or carbon capture and utilisation. A 
smart low-carbon transformation 
with low regulatory uncertainty and 
ambitious goals would increase the EU’s 
competitiveness in the global marketplace. 
As well as basic research into immature 
technologies, learning-by-doing of near-
commercial technologies can substantially 
drive down technology costs. Clear and 
stable market signals such as a minimum 
price on carbon that increases over 
time in all sectors of the EU economy 
will accelerate the deployment of these 
technologies. Renewable support schemes 
that focus on market integration of 
renewable energy generation would foster 
more flexible energy systems. Standards 
are essential for developing smart and 
flexible grid systems in the EU.
PRIORITY 4: FOSTER THE DECARBONISATION OF 
INDUSTRY AND BUILDINGS
Industry currently produces 25 percent 
of Europe’s GHG emissions (European 
Environment Agency, 2018b), and is 
subject to the EU emissions trading system 
(ETS) and thus exposed to a carbon price. 
This, together with the fact that industry is 
generally considered the most energy-effi-
cient sector, has led to no particular policies 
being proposed beyond carbon trading for 
the decarbonisation of industry. However, 
there are four elements that would justify a 
more active stance: i) Industry does not feel 
the full impact of the carbon price because 
of the protective measures devised by the 
EU to prevent loss of competitiveness. 
Many industrial sectors still receive free 
carbon allowances; ii) The EU would like 
to see growth in the manufacturing sector; 
iii) When it comes to full decarbonisa-
tion, industry faces many more technical 
challenges than other sectors, in particular 
in relation to process emissions (that is, 
emissions not associated with energy use); 
iv) The circular economy will also induce a 
significant move in the EU industrial sector 
towards more recycling, which might be 
used also as a lever for decarbonisation.
Therefore, stronger policies are needed 
to promote the long-term decarbonisation 
of industry in Europe. Priority should be 
given to the following: i) Enhance recycling 
of materials, through the extension 
of the ecodesign directive (2009/125/
EC), which should include stronger 
requirements for products to be more 
durable, repairable and easily recyclable; 
and by adding to producers’ responsibility 
for the management of their end-of-life 
products; ii) Create markets for climate-
friendly options: guaranteeing carbon 
prices for selected industrial processes; 
increasing green public procurement 
(using shadow carbon prices when 
evaluating offers, or setting limits on 
carbon intensity), harmonising labelling; 
or setting embedded carbon consumption 
taxes; iii) Create investment incentives 
while ensuring carbon leakage protection 
by spreading carbon pricing globally, 
adjusting carbon prices at the border and 
abandoning free allowance allocation, and 
applying consumption charges.
The building sector is generally regarded 
as difficult to decarbonise, notably 
because energy efficiency ambitions have 
proved challenging to achieve (European 
Commission, 2017). In this sector, 
similarly to transport, a robust energy 
efficiency effort will be the foundation of 
decarbonisation, with efforts led by the 
energy performance of buildings directive 
(2010/31/EU). For new buildings, Europe 
already has strong efficiency standards and 
performance is improving. Unfortunately, 
because of the slow turnover of the building 
stock, this is unlikely to be sufficient 
(Buildings Performance Institute Europe, 
2018). The refurbishment rate of existing 
buildings needs to be scaled up by at least a 
factor of two and the average refurbishment 
needs to deliver deeper energy demand 
reductions. This will require a combination 
of efficiency standards, targeted financing 
policies and cooperation between central 
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and municipal governments.
3  KEY ACTIONS FOR THE NEW 
EU COMMISSIONERS AND 
LAWMAKERS
The members of the European Parlia-
ment and European Commission who 
will start their mandates in 2019 have the 
historical task of unleashing the deeper 
transformation of the EU energy system 
in line with the Paris Agreement, while 
seizing the economic and industrial 
opportunities of this transformation and 
developing an EU approach to energy 
competitiveness and security. To sum-
marise, we propose four key actions to 
move forward.
KEY MEASURES TO DECARBONISE THE 
TRANSPORT SECTOR
Replace the kilometres travelled by road 
vehicles by putting in place economic 
incentives such as congestion charg-
es, public infrastructure investment in 
railways and urban public transport, 
while also refocusing urban planning 
and development licencing on sustaina-
bility. Promote the use of clean vehicles 
through a combination of stricter emis-
sions standards and gradual increases 
in road fuel taxes to internalise fully the 
environmental costs of road transport. 
This notably implies increasing fuel taxes 
and car registration taxes for polluting 
vehicles. Other externalities including 
congestion and accidents also need to be 
addressed. To ensure social acceptability, 
targeted subsidies should be put in place 
to support low-income consumers in 
the transition. The EU and its members 
must work more on fairness and social 
acceptance in an accelerated transition, 
and should carefully study the positive 
results coming from field experiments 
and best practices, such the Copenhagen 
or Amsterdam smart city plans.
KEY MEASURES TO PREPARE THE ELECTRICITY 
SYSTEM FOR A SUBSTANTIAL INCREASE IN 
RENEWABLES
Accelerate the convergence between de-
centralisation and digitalisation, notably 
by transforming the energy distribution 
grid into an open platform, via which 
multiple players (for example, domestic 
renewable energy producers, community 
renewable energy generators or storage 
provided by electric vehicles) could inter-
act in a transparent and flexible manner. 
This can be started by defining a common 
distribution operation code and by cre-
ating a common data coding and sharing 
framework. The next step would be to 
create a pan-EU framework establishing 
a coherent multi-level architecture for 
data exchange and power-flow opera-
tion to enable the proper interaction of 
transmission and distribution networks, 
microgrids and smart buildings. This 
will help to further integrate utility-scale 
renewables, by expanding transmis-
sion both onshore and offshore, and by 
enhancing flexibility. The EU electricity 
market design should also be reformed, 
to make it fully supportive of a high re-
newables system.
KEY MEASURES TO STRENGTHEN THE EU’S 
COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE IN LOW-CARBON 
TECHNOLOGIES
Target public sector research and in-
novation funding at the early stages of 
the innovation cycle, notably in areas 
in which the EU has the potential to 
maintain or develop a comparative ad-
vantage – such as in renewables, energy 
efficiency in buildings, bioenergy, bat-
teries and e-gas and e-liquids. Develop a 
predictable market environment for new 
low-carbon technologies to foster the 
emergence of a corresponding industrial 
ecosystem.
KEY MEASURES TO FOSTER DECARBONISATION 
IN INDUSTRY AND BUILDINGS
In industry, promote the recycling of 
materials, also by extending producers’ 
responsibility for the management of 
their end-of-life products. Create lead 
markets for climate-friendly options by 
guaranteeing carbon prices for selected 
industrial processes, increasing green 
public procurement and harmonising 
labelling. In buildings, make robust 
energy efficiency efforts, notably through 
a combination of efficiency standards, 
targeted financing policies and coop-
eration between central and municipal 
governments.
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